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Corporate governance, Islamic governance and earnings management in Oman: A new empirical 
insights from a behavioural theoretical framework  
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose: This paper examines the impact of corporate (CG) and Islamic (IG) governance mechanisms on 
corporate earnings management (EM) behaviour in Oman.  
 
Design/Methodology/Approach: We employ one of the largest and extensive datasets to-date on CG, IG 
and EM in any developing country, consisting of a sample of 116 unique Omani listed corporations from 
2001 to 2011 (i.e.,1,152 firm-year observations) and a broad CG index containing 72 CG provisions. We 
also employ a number of robust econometric models that sufficiently account for alternative CG/EM 
proxies and potential endogeneities. 
 
Findings: First, we find that, on average, better-governed corporations tend to engage significantly less in 
EM than their poorly-governed counterparts. Second, our evidence suggests that corporations that depict 
greater commitment towards incorporating Islamic religious beliefs and values into their operations 
through the establishment of an IG committee tend to engage significantly less in EM than their 
counterparts without such a committee. Finally and by contrast, we do not find any evidence that board 
size, audit firm size, the presence of a CG committee and board gender diversity have any significant 
relationship with the extent of EM.  
 
Originality: To the best of our knowledge, this is a first empirical attempt at examining the extent to 
which CG and IG structures may drive EM practices that explicitly seeks to draw new insights from a 
behavioural theoretical framework (i.e., behavioural theory of corporate boards and governance).  
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Islamic governance, earnings management, behavioural theory, 
endogeneity, Oman.  
 
 
 
Paper type: Research paper 
 
  
3 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we seek to contribute to the extant corporate governance (CG) and earnings 
management (EM) literature by distinctively examining how and why a firm’s CG and Islamic governance 
(IG) mechanisms may influence its EM practices. Specifically, we investigate the extent to which a broad 
composite CG index, IG committee and other CG variables can explain observable changes in firm-level 
EM in Oman. 
Although a number of previous studies have examined the association between CG and corporate EM 
practices (Chung et al., 2002; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Chen & Zhang, 2012; Leventis & 
Dimitropoulos, 2012; Anglin et al., 2013; Albu & Girbin, 2015), a careful evaluation of this literature 
reveals a number of weaknesses. First, despite increasing evidence that CG mechanisms underpinned by 
agency driven rational/opportunistic economic motives and formal structures alone may not be able to 
fully explain underlying managerial motivations for engaging in EM (Daily et al., 2003; Hambrick et al., 
2008) and thus new theoretical perspectives, such as behavioural theory, may need to be considered 
(Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011), existing studies are still overhemingly 
informed by the ubiquitous agency theoretical perspective (Davidson et al., 2005; Mitra & Cready, 2005; 
Lin et al., 2006; Rahman & Ali, 2006; Jaggi & Tsui, 2007; Jiraporn & Gleason, 2007).  
Second, Judge (2010) shows that the extent to which formal and informal CG structures/rules are 
used differ around the world. For example, equity markets tend to be the main CG mechanisms in Anglo-
Saxon economies (e.g., UK and US) compared with concentrated ownership structures in Continental 
European (e.g., German and Italy), African (e.g., South Africa and Nigeria) and Asian (e.g., Malaysia and 
Singapore) economies. Similarly, CG structures in Scandinavian economies (e.g., Norway and Sweden) 
are dominated by social norms rooted in egalitarianism/utopianism cormpared with Shariah law in Isamic 
(e.g., Oman and Saudi Arabia) countries. In transition economies (e.g., China and Russia), however, the 
primary CG mechanism is often the state/informal networks, whilst in other countries (e.g., India, South 
Korea and Japan), business groups tend to be the main CG mechanism. Despite these differences in CG 
arrangements around the world, existing studies have focused disproportionately on evaluating the effect 
of Anglo-American CG mechanisms on EM to the neglect of the others (Epps & Ismail, 2009; Ghosh et 
al., 2010; Lo et al., 2010; Bekiris & Doukakis, 2011; Alves, 2012), and thereby arguably impairing current 
understanding of the impact of CG on EM in different economies. 
Third, although a number of studies have investigated the link between CG and EM (Schipper, 1989; 
Healy & Wahlen, 1999; McNichols, 2000; Bowen et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2008), they are observably 
concentrated in a few developed countries, such as UK and US, which tend to have largely similar CG, 
economic, legal and institutional contexts (Chia et al., 2007; Francis & Wang, 2008; Krishnan & Parsons, 
2008; Gavious et al., 2012). However, it can be argued that in developing countries, such as Oman with 
different CG, economic and legal environment, the extent to which formal CG mechanisms are able to 
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restrain managerial ability to engage in EM may differ, and thus the association between CG and EM can 
be expected to vary from the findings of prior studies that were conducted in developed countries. In 
particular, behavioural theory suggests that managerial/corporate board decision-making may not only be 
influenced by their expertise, knowledge and skills, but also their experiences, beliefs and values 
(Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011).   
Indeed, there is an emerging behavioural literature, which shows that individual/corporate 
religious/cultural beliefs can affect their: (i) decision-making (Hilary & Hui, 2009) and risk-taking 
behaviour (Bartke & Schwarze, 2008); (ii) corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Brammer et al., 2007), 
equity-pricing (El Ghoul et al., 2012), social norms, cohesion and CG (Boytsun et al., 2011) and corrupt 
(Mensah 2014) practices; (iii) willingness to engage in tunnelling/expropriate shareholders’ wealth (Du, 
2013, 2014), evade tax/commit tax fraud (Stack 2006; Richardson 2008), financial reporting irregularities 
(Dyreng et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2012), philanthropy (Du et al., 2014) and EM (Callen et al., 2011; Du 
et al., 2015; Kanagaretnam et al., 2015). A major issue, however, is that these studies have mainly been 
conducted within the Judo-Christian contexts to the neglect of others, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam 
and Sikhism. In the case of Islam, although there are extensive normative/critical reviews relating to the 
distinctiveness of IG srtuctures (Lewis, 2005; Archer et al., 1998; Rahman, 1998; Choudhury & Hoque, 
2006; Kamla et al., 2006; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Williams & Zinkin, 2010), empirical evidence on how 
such IG mechanisms may drive corporate outcomes and practices, such as disclosure, performance, CSR, 
risk-taking and EM are rare (Safieddine, 2009; Farook et al., 2011; Rahman & Bukair, 2013; Ginena, 
2014; Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2016). This also impairs current understanding of how 
IG mechanisms may impact on EM practices. 
Consequently, this paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature by addressing some of the 
articulated limitations of prior studies. First, we offer new empirical insights on the CG-EM nexus by 
grounding our study in the emerging behavioural theory of corporate boards and governance, in which 
corporate decision-making is not only assumed to be underlined by formal incentives and CG 
mechanisms, but also informal CG arrangements, bounded rationality, political bargaining, routinisation 
and satisficing behaviour (van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011). In this case, we distinctively depart 
from the dominant agency theoretical framework that is underpinned mainly by formal CG structures, 
rational economic motives, managerial opportunism and optimising behaviour.  
Second, existing studies have mostly examined how individual CG mechanisms (e.g., board size 
and independent directors) can affect corporate EM practices. However, recent evidence suggests that CG 
structures tend to interrelate (i.e., CG structures are used in bundles) in order to be effective (Ntim et al., 
2015a, b), and therefore examining direct associations between individual CG structures and EM may lead 
to spurious correlations. We overcome this limitation by investigating the relationship between a 
comprehensive CG index containing 72 distinct governance privisions and EM in addition to individual 
CG mechanisms that have been used in prior studies. Third, drawing from behavioural theory, we 
conjecture that in a predominantly Islamic context, such as Oman, corporate/managerial engagement in 
EM may not only be influenced by formal CG arrangements, expertise and skills, but also by their 
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informal Islamic religious experiences, beliefs and values. We test this by examining the extent to which 
the presence of a Shariah supervisory board/committee, as a unique IG mechanism, drives corporate EM 
practices. To the best of our knowledge, this is a first direct attempt at providing empirical evidence on 
how and why IG mechanisms may influence corporate EM practices. Oman offers an interesting research 
context to test these propositions for a number of reasons. First, in response to the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis and international corporate developments, Oman was the first country in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region to pursue CG reforms in the form of the UK-style 2002 voluntary CG Code issued 
by the Capital Market Authority (CMA). Similarly, Oman is one of the few countries in the MENA 
region, which has fully adopted international accounting and auditing standards for its listed firms. This, 
thus, places Oman at the forefront when it comes to CG, accounting and auditing reforms in the MENA 
region. The central objective of these reforms has been to restore investor confidence, enhance financial 
reporting quality and protect stakeholders’ interests by improving board independence, accountability, 
disclosure, transparency and responsibility among Omani listed firms.  
Second, distinct from most developed countries, but similar to other MENA countries, the Omani 
corporate context has a number of unique features. First, Omani corporate context is characterised by: (i) 
hierarchical social structures; (ii) greater reliance on informal rules and relationships (e.g., loyalty and 
trust based on kingship, nepotism and tribalism) rather than formal CG structures (e.g., boards and audit 
committee); (iii) increased commitment to Islamic religious beliefs and values. As previously noted and 
from a behavioural theoretical perspective, greater commitment to Islamic religious values is important 
because  previous studies suggest that Judo-Christian religious beliefs and values can impact on serveral 
corporate practices, including EM (Bartke & Schwarze, 2008; Richardson, 2008; Hilary & Hui, 2009; 
Callen et al., 2011; McGuire et al., 2012). A major way by which Islamic religious beliefs and values can 
be incorporated into corporate operations and decision-making is through the establishment and operation 
of the Shariah supervisory board (Mollah & Zaman, 2015), whose central role is to certify whether 
corporate investments are Shariah compliant. Third and similar to most developing countries, Omani firms 
are characterised by high levels of concentrated ownership, primarily by families and government (Najib, 
2007; Omran et al., 2008; Bishara, 2011). This is important because concentrated ownership structures 
can render the markets for corporate control, capital, services, executive talent and labour meant to 
discipline underperforming managers and corporations ineffective (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Jaggi and 
Tsui, 2007; Alves, 2012; Chen and Zhang, 2012), and thereby often leading to managerial entrenchment. 
Whilst these contextual issues are interesting, they also raise the question of whether a UK-style voluntary 
CG Code can be effective in improving CG standards and performance, including reducing EM. We, thus, 
examine the extent to which CG and IG mechanisms may drive corporate EM practices in Oman. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides an overview of the 
institutional framework for Oman. The subsequent sections present the theoretical literature, review past 
empirical studies and develop hypotheses, present data and research methodology and report the empirical 
findings and discussion, whilst the final section summarises and concludes the paper.  
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2. Institutional framework for Oman 
  
 As briefly noted previously, the Omani CG regulatory framework was institutionalised through 
the issuance of the UK-style 2002 voluntary Code of good CG practices. The Code‘s publication was 
mainly attributed to two key factors. First, sharp declines in Muscat Security Market’s (MSM) value of 
listed firms in 1997 had a negative impact on the Omani economy in general and firms in particular 
(Fleety, 2010). The government had to make major corporate policy reforms in order to respond to such 
negative effects. Second, Oman was also influenced by a worldwide proliferation of self-regulatory 
initiatives that aimed at improving CG standards as a potential remedy for corporate failures. 
Consequently, attempts at reforming CG practices in Oman started in June 2001, when the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) organised a workshop to develop a CG Code. Consequently, the CMA issued a CG 
Code in June 2002, which came into effect in January 2003. The Code contained CG provisions relating to 
four main areas: (i) board and directors; (ii) accounting and auditing; (iii) external auditors and internal 
control systems; and (iv) disclosure and transparency (see the Appendix).  
Discernibly, the Omani Code adopted UK-style voluntary compliance and enforcement regime 
(‘comply or explain’). Specifically, the CG provisions and principles (e.g., accountability, fairness, 
independence, honesty, integrity and transparency) contained in the Omani Code was drawn mainly from 
the 1992 UK Cadbury Report, principally in relation to the composition and functions of the board of 
directors. For example, it advocated a UK-style one-tier corporate board, consisting of executive and non-
executive directors, whose operations are supported by a number of subcommitees, including audit, 
nomination and remuneration committees. The central objective of these board structures is to enhance 
CG, disclosure and transparency by improving accounting, auditing, internal control and risk management 
systems. Additionally, Oman has made explicit efforts at developing and improving the institutional 
framework for accounting and auditing. For example, Oman is one of the first countries in the MENA 
region to have fully adopted International Accounting Standards ( IASs) and subsequently, International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) with the main objective of increasing investor confidence and 
improving the credibility, comparability and quality of financial reports of Omani firms, and thereby 
reducing the extent of EM.  
As previously noted and apart from pursuing CG, accounting and auditing reforms, the Omani  
corporate context is uniquely and interestingly characterised by hierarchical social structures, increased 
corporate commitment towards incorporating Islamic religious beliefs and values into corporate operations 
and concentrated ownership structures. This characterisation is typically evident in the establishment and 
operation of Shariah supervisory boards (SSB), whose main role is to certify whether corporate operations 
and investments are consistent with the tenents of Shariah law. Commitment to Islamic religious beliefs 
and values is of keen relevance to the current study because prior studies suggest that Judo-Christian 
religious beliefs and values can have an impact on a number of corporate decisions, including managerial 
commitment to engage in EM. Overall, and whilst these contextual issues are interesting, they also raise 
the question of whether a UK-style voluntary CG Code can be effective in improving CG standards and 
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performance, including reducing EM. We, therefore, investigate the extent to which CG and IG 
mechanisms may affect corporate EM practices in Oman. 
 
3. Behavioural theoretical framework  
 
Although a number of previous studies have examined the effect of a number of different CG 
mechanisms on corporate EM practices (Chung et al., 2002; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Cornett et al., 
2008; Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Gavious et al., 2012), they are mostly informed by insights drawn from 
agency theory and often report conflicting findings (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). Observably, 
agency theory is underpinned by rational economics, optimising and opportunistic behaviour arising from 
assumed information asymmetry between corporate agents (managers) and principals (shareholders) 
(Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Agency theory, therefore, places emphasis on establishing formal 
CG structures, incentives and control mechanism to curb managerial opportunism and self-serving 
behaviour. However, increasing empirical evidence suggests that agency theory’s heavy reliance on 
formal CG strucures, complete and/or perfect contractual (e.g., bonding and monitoring contracts) 
arrangements, blanket assumptions of managerial distrust, opportunistic and self-serving behaviour, 
rational economic incentives and control mechanisms have failed to provide full explanations for the 
various actual managerial/corporate motives for engaging in EM. Noticeably, the rational economic 
(agency theory) approach has been dominant/ubiquitous because of lack of a stronger non-economic 
alternative (van Ees et al., 2009), and therefore recent years have witnessed increasing clarion calls for 
alternative theoretical perspectives to be considered (Daily et al., 2003; Hambrick et al., 2008).  
In response to these calls,  increasing number of researchers have particularly highlighted the need 
to examine behavioural processes and interactions among directors in order to fully understand the pre-
conditions for achieving effective CG arrangements (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; 
Huse et al., 2011). Specifically and drawing on the behavioural theory of the firm, van Ees et al. (2009) 
have proposed a behavioural theory of corporate boards and governance, which posits that in practice, 
instituting optimal formal governance structures aimed at resolving conflict of interests arising from 
rational economic motives and opportunistic behaviour may be less of a concern for corporate boards, and 
instead boards may be more concerned with providing practical solutions to problems of co-ordination, 
communication, planning, control and information processing. 
In particular, van Ees et al. (2009, pp.311-313) have outlined the four main behavioural 
assumptions that underline behavioural theory of corporate boards and governance in sharp contrast to 
those of the rational economics (agency) approach, including: (i) bounded rationality; (ii) satisficing 
behaviour; (iii) routinisation; and (iv) political bargaining. First and in contrast to the agency driven 
assumption of unbounded rationality, bounded rationality refers to the concept that there is a limit to 
corporate decision makers’ cognitive ability to continuously process large amounts of complex 
information and find optimal solutions to complex problems. Thus, rationality is very expensive as a great 
amount of cognitive effort is required in order to be able to implement complex rational rules, which may 
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still not be able to necessarily deliver optimal solutions. Bounded rationality, therefore, suggests that top 
management (e.g., corporate boards) decision-making processes may be improved by following simplified 
decision-making rules, as the highly complex environment (i.e., internal and external economic, cultural, 
political, social and technological environment) within which modern corporations operate can render it 
very difficult to fully appreciate the various connections among all relevant variables.  
However, bounded rationality does not necessarily suggest that the decision-makers are not 
attempting to maximise utility or achive optimal solutions; just that they are constrained by their cognitive 
and decision-making limitations. In this case, a behavioural theoretical explanation based on cognitive 
biases and limitations can be offered for any poor and inefficient decisions that have been made by 
management rather than simply attributing them to managerial opportunism and self-serving behaviour. 
For example, due to cognitive and information processing limitations, managers may make decisions (e.g., 
in reaching a forecasted or actual annual earnings figure) based on a selection of information rather than 
the complete information available. This may lead to corporate inefficiencies and failures, but it will be 
inappropriate to attribute such failures only to managerial opportunism instead of possible cognitive biases 
and incompetence. 
Second, satisficing behaviour suggests that decision-makers tend to choose practical options that 
are just sufficient or ‘good enough’ to meet/satisfy current needs rather than look for the theoretically 
optimal solution. That is, any divergence from the theoretically optimal solution cannot be construed as 
opportunistic agent behaviour as the objective is to seek satificing solution that meet current needs or 
challenges. Consequently, behavioural theory suggests that the introduction of ‘satisficing behaviour’ 
instead of ‘optimal behaviour’ can minimise the possible benefits that agents may receive from engaging 
in opportunistic decisions. Hence, the importance of personal utility maximising behaviour being the 
major determinant of managerial decisions may be reduced – with organisational decisions not viewed 
necessarily as optimal solutions, but rather as practical solutions that meet current specific 
needs/aspirations. The current levels of aspiration (‘satisfying goals’) are set based on history (e.g., past 
performance) and social environment (e.g., peer group – industry and size). For example, a company may 
simply set its future earnings target by referring to its past and/or peer group performance rather than 
being presented always as a complex opportunistic attempt by managers to deliberately manage earnings 
either upwards or downwards for their own personal gain.  
Third, van Ees et al. (2009, p.312) define routine as “standard operating procedures” or “…as 
the codified memory of the organization; embodying the past experience, knowledge, beliefs, values, and 
capabilities of the organization and its decision makers”. Thus, routines tend to be (often taken-for-
granted) tacit knowledge developed over many years and are widely accepted within an organisation, 
easily becoming part of the organisation’s beliefs, capabilities, culture, experiences, knowledge and 
values. In this case, routinisation of decision-making can be a vital source of corporate unity and control 
by eliminating conflicts of interests and conserving cognitive efforts required in reaching optimal decision, 
often through prolonged discussions and negotiations. Similar to decision making under bounded 
rationality and satisficing behaviour, decisions made based on routines can also be biased and thus lead to 
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organisation inefficiencies and failures, but divergence from optimal decisions cannot be attributed only to 
managerial self-serving behaviour instead of possible inherent limitations associated with the 
organisational rountines themselves.  
The final assumption underlying behaviouraly theory boards and governance is that it views 
corporations as complex coalitions of stakeholders engaged in continuous political bargaining. In this 
case, corporations are viewed as complex political system, consisting of coalitions and sub-coalitions of 
different stakeholders with different objectives and preferences. Distinct from agency theory, goal 
conflicts are resolved via negotiations and political barganining instead of alignment of rational economic 
motives by monitoring and incentivising managers. Therefore, organisational objectives and goals reflect 
the variety of goals and objectives that are pursued by the different stakeholders of coalitions and 
subcoalitions, which shift contantly through negotiations and political bargaining and problem solving 
processes that are aimed at achieving the objectives set by the dominant coalition. 
To sum up, behavioural theory indicates that due to cognitive and information processing 
limitations, organisational actors are rarely able to fully assess all available alternatives during decision-
making. Instead pragmatic solutions that are typically satisfactory in terms resolving immediate/current 
problems are sought. Such satisficing solutions are often inherent wihin the organisational routines and 
heuristics based on capabilities, beliefs, experiences, feelings/intutions, knowledge and values that are 
often taken-for-granted. Finally, goal formation and emerging conflicts are resolved through continuous 
process of negotiation and political bargaining towards achieving the objectives set by the dominant 
coalition. We, therefore, employ this behavioural theoretical perspective in developing our hypotheses and 
interpreting our findings. 
 
4. Literature review and hypotheses development  
 
Prior studies have examined: (i) the link between CG structures (e.g., board characteristics) and EM 
(Chung et al., 2002; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Davidson et al., 2005; Mitra & Cready, 2005; Lin et al., 
2006; Rahman & Ali, 2006; Jaggi & Tsui, 2007; Jiraporn & Gleason, 2007; Bowen et al., 2008; Jiang et 
al., 2008; Epps & Ismail, 2009; Ghosh et al., 2010; Kent et al., 2010; Lo et al., 2010; Bekiris & Doukakis, 
2011; Alves, 2012; Chen & Zhang, 2012; Leventis & Dimitropoulos, 2012; Anglin et al., 2013; Albu & 
Girbin, 2015); (ii) the effect of gender on EM (Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Gavious et al., 2012); (iii)  the 
impact of audit firm size on EM (Chia et al., 2007; Francis & Wang, 2008) or audit quality (DeAngelo, 
1981);  (iv) the effect of terrorists attacks on EM (Iatridis, 2012); and (v) the effect of executive pay on 
EM (Cornett et al., 2008). 
Others have investigated the effect of religion/culture on: (i) EM/earnings quality (Callen et al., 2011; 
Du et al., 2015; Kanagaretnam et al., 2015) and financial reporting irregularities (Dyreng et al., 2012; 
McGuire et al., 2012); (ii) CSR (Brammer et al., 2007) and corporate philanthropy (Du et al., 2014); (iii) 
agency problems (Du, 2013) and tunnelling (Du, 2014); (iv) equity-pricing (El Ghoul et al., 2012), 
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corporate decision-making (Hilary & Hui, 2009) and risk-taking (Bartke & Schwarze, 2008); and (v) tax 
evasion/tax fraud (Stack 2006; Richardson 2008) and corruption (Mensah 2014).  
Finally, there are normative/critical reviews relating to the distinctiveness of IG srtuctures (Archer et 
al., 1998; Rahman, 1998; Lewis, 2005; Choudhury & Hoque, 2006; Kamla et al., 2006; Abu-Tapanjeh, 
2009; Williams & Zinkin, 2010) and empirical evidence on how such IG mechanisms may drive corporate 
outcomes and practices, such as performance, CSR, risk-taking and EM (Safieddine, 2009; Farook et al., 
2011; Rahman & Bukair, 2013; Ginena, 2014; Mollah & Zaman, 2015). 
Consequently, we draw on the above strands of the literature, behavioural theory (Gabrielsson & 
Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011) and relevant insights from the Omani corporate 
context to identify potential CG factors that may have effect on EM. Specifically, we examine how and 
why a broad composite CG index, the presence of an IG committee (i.e., Shariah supervisory board), 
board size, audit firm size, the presence of a CG committee and board diversity on the basis of gender, 
may affect a firm’s EM practices.  
 
4.1 Firm-level composite corporate governance index (OCGI) and earnings management 
 
The dominant rational economics inspired agency theory suggests that managers are more likely 
to engage in EM because of the apparent conflict of interest that exists between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As a result, agency theory suggests that formal monitoring CG 
structures, bonding arrangments and incentive packagages can be instituted that may serve as a motivation 
for managers to produce reliable and transparent financial reports that minimise cases of EM (Fama, 1980; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). This also implies that managers in poorly-governed 
firms are more likely to behave opportunistically by engaging in EM in order to benefit at the expense of 
shareholders and other stakeholders than those of better-governed firms.  
A major limitation of the agency theory is that it assumes that managers have unlimited ability to 
continuously make rational decisions based on a full assessment of all available information that can result 
in optimal outcomes. However, the findings of recent studies based on behavioural theory (see e.g., 
reviews by Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011) indicate that due to 
cognitive biases and information processing limitations, organisational actors are rarely able to fully assess 
all available alternatives during decision-making (i.e., managerial rationality is bounded). Instead 
pragmatic solutions that are typically satisfactory in terms of resolving immediate/current problems are 
sought. Such satisficing solutions are often inherent wihin organisational routines and heuristics based on 
known capabilities, beliefs, experiences, feelings/intutions, knowledge and value that are often taken-for-
granted. Additonally, goal formation and emerging conflicts are resolved through continuous process of 
negotiation and political bargaining instead of via the alignment of rational economic motives of agents. 
Therefore, divergence of managerial decisions from optimal outcomes (in this case, poor earnings quality 
or management) may not necessarily be attributed mainly to opportunistic and self-serving behaviour of 
managers, but instead to their cognitive weaknesses rooted in bounded rationality, a commitment towards 
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achieving pragmatic and satisficing rather than theoretically oriented optimal solutions, often informed by 
trusted every day routines and heuristics based on past experiences, which usually would have emerged 
over many years of careful negotiations and political bargaining among coalitions of corporate 
stakeholders. This notwithstanding, it can be argued that in firms with better governance arrangements, 
rules underlying routines and heuristics, are more likely to have been better designed within an 
environment of healthy negotiations and political bargaining and thus, leading to a selection of satisficing 
decisions that minimise the extent of divergence from theoretically optimal solutions. In this case, better-
governed firms can be expected to engage in less EM than their poorly-governed counterparts. 
Empirically, whereas a number of studies have examined the relationship between a number of 
individual CG mechanisms and EM (e.g., Lin et al., 2006; Iatridis, 2012; Stockmans et al., 2013; Sun & 
Liu, 2013), studies investigating the association between a broad composite CG index and EM are rare. 
However, the limited studies that examine the association between firm-level EM and firm-level CG 
generally report that better-governed firms tend to engage less in EM (e.g., Bekiris et al., 2011; Leventis & 
Dimitropulos, 2012). Within the Omani corporate setting, Capital Market Authority, Muscat Security 
Market and regulatory authorities are keen on encouraging firms towards adopting good CG practices with 
the expectation that they will have positive impact on corporate performance and practices, including 
disclosure, financial transparency and earnings quality. Given the negative predictions of the theoretical 
and empirical literature, it can be hypothesised that the quality of CG, as proxied by a comprehensive CG 
index is expected to be negatively realted to EM. Hence, the first hypothesis of this paper is that:   
H1. There is a negative association between the composite CG disclosure index and firm EM 
practices.  
 
4.1 Islamic governance  committee (IGC)  and earnings management 
 
From behavioural theoretical perspective (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse 
et al., 2011), the ability of corporate agents to reach optimal decisions is limited by cognitive biases and 
complex information processing weaknesses. Managerial decision-making process will, therefore, be 
dominated by pragmatic attempts at reaching satisficing rather than optimising outcomes through 
continuous negotiations and political bargaining among coalitions of stakeholders within routines and 
heuristics arising from well-established standard operating rules and procedures. Decision-making in this 
context will be influenced by prior managerial beliefs, emotions, experiences, intuitions/feelings and 
values rather than rational thought only. Arguably, this will be particularly important in the case of Oman, 
whereby the corporate context is characterised by corporate commitment to incorporate Islamic religious 
beliefs and values into corporate operations (Archer et al., 1998; Rahman, 1998; Lewis, 2005; Choudhury 
& Hoque, 2006; Kamla et al., 2006; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Williams & Zinkin, 2010). A prominent way by 
which Omani corporate decision-making process can be guided by Islamic religious beliefs and values is 
through the establishment of the IGC in the form of the SSB. As previously noted, the main role of the 
SSB is to offer guidance as to whether corporate investments, operations and activities are in lines with 
rules, beliefs, tenets and values of Islamic Shariah law. Noticeably and unlike directors that serve on other 
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board subcommittees (e.g., remuneration, nomination, risk  and audit), the IGC members2 ought to have 
superior knowledge of Shariah law, as well as financial training and experience in order to facilitate 
appropriate evaluation and interpration of corporate decisions and disclosures. In the context of EM, the 
presence of the SSB may offer additional assurance to shareholders and other stakeholders that managers 
of firms’ with such a committee are less likely to engage in EM compared with those without it. For 
instance, Shariah principles relating to accountability, honesty, integrity, responsibility, transparency and 
truthfulnes directly prohibit managers from engaging in fraudulent activities, such as EM.  
Empirically, the findings of a limited number of studies suggest that Judo-Christian religious beliefs 
and values have a positive impact on: (i) EM/earnings quality (Callen et al., 2011; Du et al., 2015; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2015) and financial reporting irregularities (Dyreng et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 
2012); (ii) CSR (Brammer et al., 2007) and corporate philanthropy (Du et al., 2014); (iii) agency problems 
(Du, 2013) and tunnelling (Du, 2014); (iv) equity-pricing (El Ghoul et al., 2012), corporate decision-
making (Hilary & Hui, 2009) and risk-taking (Bartke & Schwarze, 2008); and (v) tax evasion/tax fraud 
(Stack 2006; Richardson 2008) and corruption (Mensah 2014). Similarly and within Islamic research 
context, the findings of a limited number of studies suggest that IG mechanisms have a positive effect on: 
(i) CG practices (Safieddine, 2009); (ii) risk management practices (Ginena, 2014); (iii) CSR practices 
(Farook et al., 2011; Rahman & Bukair, 2013); and (iv) financial performance (Mollah & Zaman, 
2015). Of direct relevance to our study and using a sample of 2,624 firm-year observations over 1993-
2008, Quttainah et al. (2013) provide evidence that there is no significant difference in the extent of EM 
between banks with IGC in comparison with those without IGC. In contrast, using a sample of 90 Islamic 
banks from 2000 to 2009, Hamdi and Zarai (2014) document evidence that suggests that banks with IGC 
are less likely to conduct EM compared with those without IGC. Despite inconclusive empirical evidence 
and following theoretical predictions, the second hypothesis of this paper is that:   
    H2. There is a negative association between Islamic governance committee and firm EM 
           practices.  
 
4.2 Board size (BSIZE)  and earnings management 
 
Conventional agency theory suggests that firms with larger boards are likely to be less effective in 
monitoring managers because such boards may suffer from poor coordination and communication 
problems (Jensen, 1993), and thus allowing opportunistic managers to engage in self-serving behaviour 
by, for example, managing earnings upwards in order to boost their compensation packages (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In this case, smaller boards are expected to provide more effective monitoring in 
reducing EM. An alternative perspective is that firms with larger boards have greater diversity in 
experience, technical expertise and skills, including accounting and financial knowledge than smaller 
boards. This implies that companies with larger boards are better placed to monitor managers, including 
the ability to detect financial reporting irregularities, such as EM (Pfeffer, 1972; Klein, 2002). Thus, from 
                                                 
2Similar to other board subcommittees, the SSB is recommended by a firm’s board for approval by shareholders at a general 
assembly meeting.  
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this perspective, effective monitoring is more likely to be found in larger boards, which may help in 
reducing managers’ incentive to engage in EM.  
However, behavioural theory challenges the dominant rational economics led idea that always 
attributes questionable corporate behaviour and poor performance (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et 
al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011), such as financial reporting mistakes to managerial motive to exploit corporate 
resources for their own benefits. In particular, behavioural theory suggests that there is a limit to the extent 
to which directors are able to think (cognitive biases), process complex information and make rational 
decisions (bounded rationality), and hence tend to engage in searching for satisficing rather than 
optimising solutions. Therefore, such managerial/corporate decisions may be based on formal and 
informal (e.g., personal beliefs, values and experiences) routines established over a period of time through 
careful political bargaining and negotiations among different coalitions of corporate stakeholders. Hence, 
the extent to which corporate boards may be able to ensure that companies are governed effectively may 
not only be limited to corporate boards’ ability to monitor the so-called opportunistic managers, but also 
how they are able to formally and informally interact, relate, discuss and share ideas among themselves as 
a team. In this case and within the Omani corporate conext, symbiotic relationships in terms of thought, 
experiences, values and beliefs, especially religious (Islamic) beliefs may play important role in creating 
cohesive and fruitful discussions among directors and consequently, improving the corporate decision-
making process, including those relating to enhancing accountability, transparency and financial reporting 
quality. We, therefore, suggest that one way of explaining corporate decisions and practices, such as EM is 
to look into individual and corporate behaviours, including formal and informal interactions, processes, 
routines, beliefs, experiences and values.  
Empirically, a number of prior studies have provided some insights into the role of board size in 
mitigating EM, but their results are not only highly mixed, but also none (to the best of our knowledge) of 
them have examined it from a behavioural perspective and therefore, this offers genuine opportunities to 
contribute to the literature. For example, a negative relationship between board size and EM has been 
reported by Xie et al. (2003) and Ghosh et al. (2010). In contrast, Rahaman and Ali (2006), Epps and 
Ismail (2009) and Alves (2012) offer empirical evidence that suggests that board size has a positive 
relationship with EM. Following the mixed empirical and theoretical suggestions, we predict a significant 
relationship between board size and EM without specifying the direction of the coefficient. Therefore, the 
third hypothesis proposed in this paper is that: 
H3. There is a association between board size and firm EM practices. 
 
4.3 Audit firm size (BIG4) and earnings management 
 
Accounting scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, emphasise the crucial role of audit quality, 
where an external auditor’s ability to professionally monitor managers by verifying financial statements is 
influenced by his/her qualities. One argument rooted in rational economics is that large audit firms have 
diverse set of skills, experiences, expertise, knowledge and financial resources, including information 
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processing capabilities to provide high-quality audits than their smaller counterparts (e.g., DeAngelo, 
1981; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Uang et al., 2006).  Additionally, larger audit firms have higher reputation to 
protect compared with smaller audit firms, and thus have a lot to loose in case of post-audit detection of 
financial reporting irregularities, such as incidences of EM. Larger audit firms are, therefore, able to 
engage in effective audit negotiations, as well as challenge managerial decisions relating to a wide range 
of accounting transactions and treatments, and thereby able to expose financial reporting irregularities.  
Together, these suggest that managers electing to be audited by larger audit firms are lesss likely to engage 
in EM compared to those audited by smaller audit firms, and therefore a negative relationship between 
audit firm size and EM can be expected.  
However, these agency theoretic assumptions do not take into consideration the fact that auditors 
ability to make such rational decisions are limited (cognitively) and that auditors may not always be able 
to secure optimal solutions. This is particularly important for auditing because due to information 
processing limitations, auditors often select a sample of accounting transactions and treatments  in order to 
test the accuracy of an entire accounting system of a corporation, as well as in forming a satisfactory audit 
opinion regarding the true and fair view of the underlying accounting treatments and transactions. Such 
satisficing audit decisions and opinions are often made by auditors based on their formal and informal 
experiences, beliefs, knowledge and values, which are usually rooted in a well established personal and 
corporate rules, processes, procedures and routines. We, therefore, suggest that behavioural theory offers a 
promising way of explaining why corporate decisions may sometimes deviate from optimal, such as 
failing to identify financial reporting irregularities/EM without necessarily assuming rational opportunistic 
behaviour of corporate actors and stakeholders.   
Empirically, studies examining the association between audit firm size and EM practices are rare, 
although a negative relationship has been reported by a few previous studies (e.g., Chia et al., 2007; 
Francis & Wang, 2008; Kent et al., 2010; Iatridis, 2012). In contrast, no significant association has been 
reported by some studies (e.g., Davidson et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2007). One discernible limitation of 
these studies is that they are all informed by the ubiquitous rational economics inspired agency theory and 
thus, providing insights from a behavioural theoretical perspective has the potential to contribute to the 
literature by offering new theoretical insights. In line with the mixed empirical and theoretical suggestions, 
however, we predict a significant relationship between audit firm size and EM without specifying the 
direction of the coefficient. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis proposed in this paper is that: 
H4. There is aassociation between audit firm size and firm EM practices. 
 
4.4 Corporate governance committee (CGCOM) and earnings management 
 
Given the increased focus on board composition, board committees are considered internal CG 
mechanisms that help the board to actively monitor managers. Among these committees, a CG committee, 
as its name implies, is expected to fulfil the important role of assisting the board in ensuring good CG 
practices within a firm. In this sense, a CG committee aims to promote CG practices by clearly defining 
governance arrangements and ensuring that the governance framework adopted by the firm is followed 
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and updated. In particular and from a behavioural theoretical perspective, a CG committee may be able to 
assist in developing rules and routines based on corporate beliefs, experiences and values, which may lead 
to the achievement of satisficing solutions to CG challenges. Arguably, having a clear set of guidelines on 
best CG practices provided by a CG committee are more likely to reduce managers’ discretion on financial 
reporting. Therefore, the theoretical prediction on the relationship between the presence of a CG 
committee and EM practices is more likely to be negative than positive.  
Unlike other board committees (e.g., audit and executive committees), however, the presence of a 
CG committee and its potential impact on EM has not been empirically investigated in the literature and 
hence, evaluating the extent to which the presence of a CG committee may drive corporate EM practices 
may help in expanding current understanding of an important aspect of corporate accounting behaviour. 
However, prior studies have shown that the presence of a CG committee impacts positively on: (i) CG 
disclosures (Ntim et al, 2012a); (ii) risk disclosures (Ntim et al., 2013); (iii) CSR disclosures (Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013); (iv) performance (Ntim, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015b); and (iv) executive compensation 
(Ntim et al., 2015b). The presence of a CG committee can, therefore, be expected to restrain the extent of 
EM and therefore, the fifth hypothesis to be tested in this paper is that:   
H5. There is a negative association between the presence of a CG committee and firm   
       EM practices. 
 
4.5 Board diversity on the basis of gender (GNDR) and earnings management 
 
From a behavioural theoretical perspective, prior studies indicate that female directors are more 
sensitive to ethical issues (e.g., Bernardi & Arnold, 1997) and exhibit greater risk aversion (e.g., Sunden & 
Surette, 1998) and has better board meetings attendance record (e.g., Adamas & Ferreia, 2009) than male 
directors. Female board participation is likely to create formal and informal discussions between board of 
directors and result in greater accountability for managerial decisions (Adamas & Ferreia, 2009). Further, 
female board participation can assist boards to benefit from a wide pool of talent by bringing different 
skills and experiences into the boardroom, including soft, but inteligent femine beliefs, emotions, 
experiences, feelings and values. Thus, this can improve the boards’ professionalism in evaluating firms’ 
financial reports and detecting any financial reporting irregularities (Pfeffer, 1972; Nielsen and Huse, 
2010). Arguably, a mix of male and female non-executive directors on a board may not only help in 
improving managerial monitoring as inherent in the rational agency theoretical perspective, but also in 
reaching better satisficing decisions by bringing stronger emotional intelligence into the corporate board 
decision-making process and thereby potential minimising incidences of EM (Adams & Ferreia, 2009, 
Srinidhi et al., 2011).    
Empirically, most previous studies (e.g., Clikeman et al., 2001; Krishnan & Parsons, 2008) mainly 
examine the effect of gender on earnings quality by considering female members of senior managers. In 
contrast, studies examining the impact of gender on earnings quality that consider the presence of females 
on corporate boards are limited (e.g., Srinidhi et al., 2011; Gavious et al., 2012). Given the theoretical 
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prediction and empirical literature, it can be hypothesised that board diversity on the basis of gender is 
likely to negatively influence EM. Hence, the final hypothesis to be tested in this paper is that:   
H6. There is a negative association between board diversity on the basisof gender and firm EM  
       practices. 
 
5. Data and research methodology 
 
5.1 Data: Sample selection, sources and description 
 
The dataset used in our paper is drawn from the population of Omani firms listed on Muscat 
Security Market during 2001 to 2011, and Table 1 contains a summary of the sample seclection procedure. 
The initial sample consisted of 168 firms as of December 2011. To determine the final sample, we 
excluded some firms based on the following criteria3: (i) a firm must have CG, accounting and financial 
information data for at least one year from 2001 to 2011 inclusive; and (ii) any given industry must have 
at least 10 observations over the 11 years examined.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
5.2 Research methodology: Definition of variables and model specification  
 
We employ five main types of variables to conduct our regression analysis, namely: (i) EM’s variable; (ii) 
a composite CG index; (iii) Omani context specific variable (i.e., IG committee); (iv) other CG variables; 
and (v) control variables, consisting of ownership and firm-specific characteristics. First, our main 
dependent variable is EM. A number of approaches have been suggested and used by researchers to 
measure EM. Therefore, in this study, we employ two widely used model. First, we employ the 1995 
modified Jones model, as our primary model for calculating firm-level EM. Specifically, we follow a three 
stage approach in estimating EM. First, total accruals are regressed on revenues (REV) and gross property, 
plant, and equipment (PPE) using this equation: TACit
TAit-1
 = α1 1TAit-1 + α2 
∆ Revit
TAit-1
  + α3 PPEitTAit-1 + εit  (1), where 
TAC refers to total accruals in year t for firm i, which is calculated as net income minus operating cash 
flow. TA refers to total assets in year t–1 for firm i. ΔRev refers to revenues in year t less revenues in year 
t–1 for firm i. PPE refers to gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i. εit is the idiosyncratic 
error term in year t for firm i. All variables are divided by lagged total assets in order to mitigate any 
potential heteroskedasticity problems, and the cash flow approach is adopted in order to calculate total 
                                                 
3There were three main reasons for setting these criteria. First, the data collection started with financial year 2001 since it was the 
first year for which data was available. Second, the sample ends in the 2011 because it was the latest year for which data was 
available. Finally, using fewer than 10 observations can render the estimated coefficients inefficient since the EM measures used 
in this study require an estimation of a cross-sectional regression for each industry (McNichols, 2000). Using these criteria, and as 
outlined in Table 1, the sample procedure produced unbalanced panel data of 116 unique firms (i.e., a total of 1,152 firm year 
observations over the 11 years investigated). To the best of our knowledge, this is by far the largest dataset to be used in any 
Middle Eastern and North African study on CG to date. We collected all our CG data from corporate annual reports, which were 
downloaded from the Perfect Information Database and Muscat Security Market website, whilst financial (i.e., accounting and 
market) data was collected from DataStream.   
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accruals, which is in line with a considerable number of prior studies (e.g., Hribar et al., 2002; Davidson et 
al., 2005; Chen & Zhang, 2012). 
Second, the coefficients estimated from equation (1) are used in equation (2) in order to estimate 
non-discretionary accruals as follows: NDAit = �1 1TAit-1 + α2  ( ∆ RevitTAit-1  - ∆ RecitTAit-1  ) + α3 PPEitTAit-1  (2), where 
everything remains the same as defined in equation (1) except that ∆����� is included, which presents 
receivables in year t less receivables in year t–1 for firm i. Finally, the amount of discretionary accruals 
(DA), which we use as evidence of the extent of EM is calculated by using the following equation: DA�� = 
TACit
TAit-1
  - NDAit   (3). Second, we use the 2005 Kothari et al. model to measure EM in order to check the 
robustness of our findings to alternative EM estimation techniques that takes into account the managerial 
opportunity to engage in real earnings manipulations rather than through discretaionary accruals (e.g., 
Cohen et al., 2008; Kothari et al., 2005, 2015). Observably, the two models have been chosen for the 
following reasons: (i) there is no theory that specifies which of the models produces better EM estimates; 
(ii) data limitations implies that we are unable to implement every model available; and (iii) the two 
models have been widely used in the extant literature (e.g., Jiang et al., 2008; Sun & Liu, 2013) to 
examine EM and therefore, their validity have been widely tested. Further, we adopt signed discretionary 
accruals rather than absolute abnormal accruals because we intend to measure firm-level EM in the 
presence of a particular directional prediction as the relation between signed abnormal accruals and CG 
variables can be predicted (Bowen et al., 2008).   
Second, our main independent variable is a composite CG index. Following suggestions in the prior 
literature that CG can be better examined by a composite CG index (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Bowen 
et al., 2008), we measured firm-level CG by using comprehensive CG index. Among the two commonly 
used measures of CG indices are: researcher constructed; and (ii) subjective analysts’ CG 
rankings/indices. We construct our own index instead using subjective analysts’ CG indices/rankings for 
three main reasons. The OCGI is constructed mainly based on the 2002 Omani code of CG. The eight CG 
themes contained in the code were categorised into four broad sections in order to extract CG provisions. 
This resulted in 72 individual CG provisions falling under four broad sections: (i) board of directors; (ii) 
accounting and auditing; (iii) external auditors and internal control systems; and (iv) disclosure and 
transparency. Some CG provisions contained in the 1974 Companies Act had to be added into the OCGI 
in order to achieve a comprehensive CG index. The OCGI is considered to be reliable as the Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha for the four categories in the OCGI is 0.78, suggesting that a random measurement error 
is less likely to reduce the power of the empirical tests (Pallant, 2010). The OCGI’s construction was also 
guided by those of previsous CG studies (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a, b).  First, most subjective analysts’ CG 
rankings are designed by international professional organisations; hence may not be applicable to the 
Omani corporate context due to differences in CG regimes. Second, there is no national professional 
organisation in Oman, which publishes ready to be used CG indices. Third, unlike subjective analysts’ CG 
rankings, our constructed index is a direct measure of actual CG disclosure and covers a wide range of 
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internal CG disclosure items (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Donelly & Mulcahy, 2008). Thus, we constructed 
a comprehensive Omani CG index (OCGI). The OCGI is constructed mainly based on the 2002 Omani 
code of CG. The eight CG themes contained in the code were categorised into four broad sections in order 
to extract CG provisions. This resulted in 72 individual CG provisions falling under four broad sections: 
(i) board of directors; (ii) accounting and auditing; (iii) external auditors and internal control systems; and 
(iv) disclosure and transparency. Some CG provisions contained in the 1974 Companies Act had to be 
added into the OCGI in order to achieve a comprehensive CG index. The OCGI is considered to be 
reliable as the Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for the four categories in the OCGI is 0.78, suggesting that a 
random measurement error is less likely to reduce the power of the empirical tests (Pallant, 2010). The 
OCGI’s construction was also guided by those of previsous CG studies (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a, b).  The 
CG score-sheet was designed to code firms on their level of CG practices, and the annual reports of the 
116 firms were analysed and compared with the OCGI’s provisions. A score of 1 was assigned if a 
particular CG provision was applied, and 0 otherwise. The degree of CG’s practices level for each firm 
was aggregated and expressed as a percentage, with the scoring ranging from complete non-compliance 
(zero score - 0%) to perfect compliance (a score of 72 - 100%).   
The IG committee represents our third group of variables that we use in our study, which is 
uniquely relevant to the Omani corporate context. The fourth group of variables that we empoly in our 
analysis include other CG variables (i.e., board size, audit firm size , the presence of a CG committee, and 
board diversity on the basis of gender). Our final group of variables is our control variables, consisting of 
ownership (i.e., block ownership, foreign ownership, government ownership and institutional ownership) 
and other firm-specific characteristics  (i.e., firm size, profitability, growth, leverage, industry dummy, and 
year dummy). Table 2 presents  summary definitions of all variables includeded in our models.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
We begin our analysis by employing Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as our initial estimation 
method and multiple linear regression as a statistical technique to examine the extent to which CG and IG 
can influence EM. Assuming all predicted relationships are linear, firm-level EM as a dependent variable 
were regressed on several explanatory variables as specified in the following regression model:  
 
∑= ++
++++++=
n
i
ititi
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CONTROLS
GNDRCGCOMBIGBSIZEIGCOCGIDA
1
9876210 4εβ
ββββββα
           (4)           
Where DA refers to discretionary accruals, OCGI is the Omani CG index, IGC is Islamic governance 
committee, BSIZE is the board size, BIG4 is audit firm size, CGCOM is the presence of a CG committee, 
and GNDR is board diversity on the basis of gender. CONTROLS refers to control variables, including 
ownership variables, consisting of block ownership (BLKOWN), foreign ownership (FOROWN), 
government ownership (GOVOWN) and institutional ownership (INSOWN) and firm-specific 
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characteristics, namely firm size (LNTA), growth (GROWTH), profitability, (ROA), leverage (LVRG), 
industry, and year dummies.   
 
6. Empirical results and discussions 
 
6.1 Empirical results: Descriptive statistics and univariate regression analysis 
 
Summary descriptive statistics of the level of compliance with the Omani corporate governance 
index (OCGI)  and its sub-indices for each of the eleven firm-years, as well as all variables included in our 
analysis are presented in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. First, the findings in Panel A of Table 3 indicate that 
the levels of compliance with the OCGI’s provisions across firm years vary substantially among Omani 
listed firms. Specifically and for example, the aggregate compliance levels have increased from 6.78% in 
2001 to 60.93% in 2009, evidence which is largely consistent with those of prior studies that compliance 
with CG provisions improves over time (e.g., Akkermans et al., 2007; Ntim et al., 2012a, b). The 
aggregate mean scores range from a minimum of 1.39% to a maximum of 88.89%, with the average 
Omani firm complying with 47.89% of the 72 individual CG provisions examined over the 2001 to 2011 
period.  
Similarly, the statistics in Panels B, C, D and E of Table 3 suggest that there is substantial degree 
of dispersion in the distribution of each sub-index, as well as similar increasing levels of compliance with 
respect to each sub-index over the period of our examination. For instance, the board and directors’ sub-
index ranges from 0% to 97.44% with the average corporations complying with 38.59%. Omani firms 
appear to have relatively higher compliance with both accounting and auditing provisions (75.37%), and 
disclosure and transparency provisions (64.04%), intermediate level of compliance with the board and 
directors provisions (38.59%), and lower level of compliance with external auditors and internal control 
systems provisions (2.43%). The key conclusion from examining the level of compliance with the 72 
individual CG provisions is that despite the initial theoretical prediction that the issuance of the 2002 CG 
code would effectively encourage firms to adopt better CG measures, CG compliance among Omani listed 
firms is still low. Further, the evidence that emerges from Table 3 suggests that contrary to the expectation 
that the 2002 CG Code’s reliance on Anglo-American model may not lead to improvement in CG 
standards among Omani listed firms due to the large differences in corporate contexts, the 2002 Omani 
voluntary CG Code appears to have helped in promoting good CG practices among Omani listed firms to 
some extent. The findings of this analysis are also consistent with those of prior studies (e.g., Ntim et al., 
2012a, b) that contrary to general concerns about the ability of voluntary  CG Codes to improve CG 
standards in a particular setting, Omani firms have shown some positive response to the best practice 
recommendations that are contained in the 2002 Omani CG Code.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Second, Table 4 presents descriptive statistics relating to the EM, as well as the rest of the explanatory 
variables. For example, it shows that EM, denoted by the signed discretionary accruals (DA), ranges from 
a minimum of -0.1946 to a maximum of 0.3301, with an average of 0.0304 over the period of our 
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examination. This reveals that Omani listed firms, on average, appear to manage their earnings upwards 
with average abnormal accruals equal to about 3% of lagged total assets. Overall, the average DA is 
consistent with the figures reported by a number of past studies (e.g., Mitra and Cready, 2005; Jiang et al., 
2008; Lo et al., 2010; Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011). We observe  similar wide spreads among the 
explanatory and control variables. For instance, block ownership, labelled as BLKOWN  ranges from 
0.0000 to 0.9947 with an average of 55%.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
In addition to the statistical analysis that we conduct before examining our main research 
hypotheses, we test a number of OLS assumptions, including the presence of multicollinearity problems 
amon the variables. Table 5 presents the correlation matrix to test for multi-collinearity problems. As a 
robustness check, we report both the Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric coefficients. 
Generally, the coefficients indicate that no serious multicollinearities among all the variables used. 
Further, a number of statistical analysis were carried out (which for brevity are not reported here, but wiil 
be available on request) in order to test for other OLS assumptions before examining our hypotheses.4  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
6.2 Empirical results: OLS (multivariate) regression analysis  
 
Table 6 reports the effect of the OCGI, IG committee (IGC) and other CG variables (board size - 
BSIZE; audit firm size – BIG4; the presence of a CG committee – CGCOM; and board gender diversity - 
GNDR) on EM. Generally, Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 present the findings of the main Model related to 
the effect of CG on EM. These findings indicate that OCGI and IGC are significant in explaining cross-
sectional differences in the DA. First, the negative coefficient on the OCGI is in line with  our behavioural 
theoretical framework, which suggests that the capacity of managers and corporate boards to think, 
process complex information and decide rationally is cognitively limited (bounded rationality) 
(Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011). Therefore, managers tend to 
take pragmatic steps that are often aimed at securing satisficing (“satisficing behaviour and problemistic 
search”) rather than optimising (rational economic behaviour) solutions by following well-established 
corporate beliefs, knowledge, values, rules, procedures, processes and routines (“routinisation of decision-
making”) that have usually been developed based on careful negotiations and political bargaining 
(“political bargaining in the context of corporations as coalitions of stakeholders”) among a coalition of 
corporate stakeholders (van Ees et al., 2009, pp.311-312).  Thus, deviations from optimal solutions and 
in this case, evidence of EM behaviour may not necessarily be explained by incentives of managers to 
self-serve their rational economic interests (e.g., to increase executive pay by managing earnings upwards 
                                                 
4The OLS assumptions, namely linearity, normality, multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity were tested in order 
to ensure that OLS regression technique is statistically appropriate to be used to perform our regression analysis.The effects of 
outliers were minimised by winsorising, and the first-order autoregressive method was adopted in order to take account of serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity. Overall, the diagnostics for the OLS assumptions indicate that the OLS estimation tool is 
statistically appropriate as a main estimation method to perform our OLS regression analysis. 
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and thereby expropriating corporate resources), but instead due to cognitive biases (bounded rationality) 
and pratical (complex information collection and processing challenges) limitations that may motivate 
managers to pragmatically seek satsisficing solutions to current problems. The findings offer further 
support to the behavioural theory’s suggestions that informal interactions, relationships, discussions, 
emotions, experiences, beliefs and values are equally important in determining the effectiveness of CG 
structures. Empirially, the negative association between DA and the OCGI provides support for H1 and the 
findings of past studies (e.g., Mitra & Credy, 2005; Jiraporn & Gleason, 2007; Cornett et al., 2008; Wang, 
2014), who report evidence that suggests that companies with good CG practices tend to engage less in 
EM compared with those with poor CG structures.  
Second, our model shows that IGC is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance, suggesting that H2 is also empirically supported. The evidence is largely in line with the 
predictions of our behavioural theoretical framework. Specfically and from behavioural theoretical 
perspective (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011), we argue that the ability 
of corporate agents to reach optimal decisions is limited by cognitive biases and complex information 
processing weaknesses. Managerial decision-making process will, therefore, be dominated by pragmatic 
attempts at reaching satisficing rather than optimising outcomes through continuous negotiations and 
political bargaining among coalitions of stakeholders within routines and heuristics arising from well-
established standard operating rules and procedures. Decision-making in this context will be influenced by 
prior managerial beliefs, emotions, experiences, intuitions/feelings and values rather than rational thought 
and economic opportunism only. Arguably, this will be particularly important in the case of Oman, 
whereby the corporate context is characterised by corporate commitment to incorporate Islamic religious 
beliefs and values into business operations (Archer et al., 1998; Rahman, 1998; Lewis, 2005; Choudhury 
& Hoque, 2006; Kamla et al., 2006; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Williams & Zinkin, 2010; Mollah & Zaman, 
2015). A prominent way by which the Omani corporate decision-making process can be guided by Islamic 
religious beliefs and values is through the establishment of the IGC in the form of the SSB. As previously 
noted, the main role of SSB is to offer guidance as to whether corporate investments, operations and 
activities are in lines with rules, beliefs, tenets and values of Islamic Shariah law. In the context of EM, 
the presence of the SSB may offer additional assurance to shareholders and other stakeholders that 
managers of firms with such a committee are less likely to engage in EM compared with those without it. 
For instance, Shariah principles relating to accountability, honesty, integrity, responsibility, transparency 
and truthfulnes directly prohibit managers from engaging in fraudulent activities, such as EM. 
Empirically, it offers new insights on the effect of IG on EM, as well as lends support to the result of 
Hamdi and Zarai (2014).  
Third, our model predicts no significant relationship between each of board size (BSIZE), audit 
firm size (BIG4), the presence of a CG committee (CGCOM), and board gender diversity (GNDR), and 
DA, implying that H3, H4, H5  and H6 are, respectively, not empirically supported. Finally, to ascertain 
how sensitie the findings are to our DA measure, we include several control (ownership and other firm-
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specific characteristics) variables in Models 1 to 8 with all the findings being largely consistent across the 
eight Models. With specific reference to the control variables, our findings suggest that firms with high 
growth (GROWTH), leverage (LVRG), profitability (ROA) and block ownership (BLKOWN) tend to 
engage significantly more in EM, whereas those with high government ownership (GOVOWN) and 
institutional ownership (INSOWN) tend to engage significantly less in EM, and thereby offering additional 
new insights and contributions regarding the effect of CG, ownership and other firm-specific variables on 
the extent of corporate EM. 
Furthermore, Models 2 to 4 present the effect of each group of variables on EM. In doing so, 
only the effect of the OCGI as an integrated system on EM in addition to control variables are included in 
Model 2 as reported by Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6. We find similar findings to those reported in the main 
Model indicating that the OCGI is statistically significant and negatively associated with DA at the 10% 
level of significance. Discernibly, the control variables also show significant relationships with DA. In 
addition, to examine the effect of the IGC separately from the other explanatory variables, Column 6 and 7 
of Table 6 repeat Model 3 findings of multivariate regression of DA on the IGC and control variables with 
the findings contained in Colums 6 and 7 of Table 6 indicating that all the variables remain statistically 
significant. Thus, our evidence that the presence of an IG committee tend to constrain the extent of EM is 
robust to the inclusion of the other control variables. Similarly, the other CG variables (BSIZE, BIG4, 
CGCOM and GNDR) along with the control variables were examined separately from the OCGI and IGC 
in order to observe their impact on EM. The findings of this analysis that are also largely consistent with 
those contained in the main model are reported in Columns 8 and 9 of Table 6. 
Moreover, in order to investigate which of the four sub-indies contributes more to DA, we re-
regress equation (1) by replacing the OCGI with each sub-index one at a time. Statistically significant and 
negative effect of board and directors,  and accounting and auditing on DA is observable in Models 5 and 
6 of Table 6, while Models 7 and 8 show that external auditors and internal control systems and disclosure 
and transparency have negative effect on DA, but statistically insignificant.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
7. Robustness analysis  
 
We conduct a series of robustness estimations to examine the extent to which our main findings 
are robust or sensitive to the use of: (i) alternative CG weighted index; (ii) alternative EM’s proxy; (iii) 
financial firms inclusion; (iv) the pre- and post-2002 CG Code issuance; and (v) any potential endogeneity 
problems. The findings of these analyses are presented in Models 2 to 7 of Table 7 with the findings 
contained in Model 1 repeating our previous main findings in order to facilitate easy comparative analysis. 
First, we account for the likelihood that using weighted CG index may result in different findings. As 
explained earlier, un-weighted index was used to perform our main analysis where all 72 CG provisions 
constituting the four sub-indies of the OCGI have different weightings. The four sub-indies include 39, 7, 
4, and 22 CG provisions contributing to the OCGI by 54%, 10%, 6% and 30%, respectively. Following 
prior studies’ procedure in constructing weighted CG index (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006), an alternative OCGI 
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was constructed in which each sub-index was scored by awarding similar weight of 25%. We replaced our 
un-weighted OCGI with the weighted OCGI in equation (4), and the findings are reported in Model 2 of 
Table 7, with the results indicating that our main Model’s findings are not sensitive to using a weighted 
CG index.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
Second, we replicate our main analysis by using a different measure of EM developed by Kothari 
et al. (2005) in order to examine whether our main findings are sensitive to the DA’s proxy employed that 
explicitly takes the likelihood of real earnings manipulations into account (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; 
Kothari et al., 2005, 2015). The results presented in Model 3 of Table 7 suggest that our evidence is robust 
to the use of this alternative EM measure. Third, we account for the possibility that the inclusion of 
financial companies5 in our data set may lead to different results by re-regressing equation (4) using only 
non-financial firms (859 firm years). The results reported in Model 4 are essentially similar to those 
presented in Model 1 of the same table. This may be due to the fact that Omani financial and non-financial 
firms operate in an environment, where corporate regulations, including CG ones are applicable to both 
financial and non-financial firms in an equal measure. Fourth, to ascertain whether our findings are 
sensitive over the sample period of our examination, we re-run our analysis by splitting our sample into 
two sub-samples: Pre-2003 (i.e., from 2001 to 2002) and Post-2003 (2003 to 2011) periods. It is 
evident from the reported results in Models 5 and 6 of Table 7 that the main variable (OCGI) is 
insignificant in the Pre-2003 period compared with that of the Post-2003 period, suggesting that the 
introduction of the 2002 Omani CG Code appears to have helped in reducing firms’ EM. Finally, we 
employ the widely used 2SLS technique to check the possibility of endogenity problems that may arise as 
a result of omitted variables and/or simultaneity (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010).6 This may cause the OLS 
results (main results) to be biased and inconsistent. Following Larcher and Rusticus (2010) methodology, 
the Hausman test is employed to detect the existence of any endogeneity problems. The test is made up of 
two stages. In the first stage and as specified in equation (5) below, the OCGI is regressed on the control 
variables and its resulting predicted values are saved as P_OCGI.  
                                  ∑= ++= ni ititiit CONTROLSOCGI 10 εβα                                                            (5) 
Where the OCGI refers to the Omani CG index and CONTROLS refers to the control variables, which are 
the same as those used in equation (4). In the second stage, the OCGI and P_OCGI in addition to the 
control variables are included in the following equation. 
                                                 
5As previously noted, both financial and non-financial firms were included in the main analysis. In this regard, and although the 
nature of financial firms’ accruals may differ from those of non-financial firms, prior studies that examine the relation between 
CG and EM have not provided any empirical evidence to confirm the theoretical argument that the impact of CG on accruals in 
non-financial firms is not comparable to those in financial firms because the latter are subject to more specific accounting 
requirements. As a result, we aim to provide empirical evidence of whether there is a significant difference in CG’s influence on 
EM between financial and non-financial firms in an emerging country like Oman.  
6The potential of this problem arises when the OCGI assumed to be exogenous in equation (4) is associated with the error term 
because an important control variable is not included in the model (e.g., unavailability of data) and/or when the dependent 
variable simultaneously determines the independent variable (Wooldridge, 2009).  
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                 ∑= ++++= ni ititiititit CONTROLSOCGIPOCGIDA 1210 _ εβββα                           (6) 
Where DA refers to the discretionary accruals measured by the 1995 modified Jones Model, OCGI refers 
to the Omani CG index, P_OCGI refers to the predicted values of the OCGI and CONTROLS refers to the 
control variables, which are the same as those used in equation (4), with the test rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no endogeneity. In this sense, the 2SLS technique was performed as follows. In the first 
stage, the OCGI is assumed to be determined by the six control variables and four new alternative CG 
variables.7 The first stage regression is specified as follows (for brevity, the first stage results are not 
reported here, but will be available upon request).  
    ∑= ++++++= ni ititiititititit CONTROLSCAPEXNBMsNEXDBDIVOCGI 143210 εβββββα          (7) 
Where OCGI refers to the Omani CG index, BDIV, NEXD, NBMs, and CAPEX are defined as board 
diversity on the basis of nationality, the number of non-executive directors on the board, the number of 
board’s directors meetings, and capital expenditure, respectively. CONTROLS refers to control variables 
which are the same as those used in equation (4). The predicted value of the OCGI is saved and referred to 
it as P_OCGI, as well as the residuals is saved and referred to it as R_OCGI. The correlation matrix 
(which for brevity is not reported here, but will be made available upon request) shows that the predicted 
value of the OCGI (P_OCGI) is highly correlated with the OCGI and lowly correlated with the R_OCGI, 
indicating that the P_OCGI is relevant and valid instrument for the OCGI. In the second stage, equation 
(4) is re-estimated by using the P_OCGI instead of the OCGI as specified below.  
 
∑= ++
++++++=
n
i
ititi
ititititititit
CONTROLS
GNDRCGCOMBIGBSIZEIGCOCGIPDA
1
9876210 4_ εβ
ββββββα
           (8)         
Where everthing remains the same as those used in equation (4) except that we replace the OCGI with its 
predicted values (P_OCGI). The results of the 2SLS are presented in Model 7 of Table 7, which are 
considerably in line with those obtained by estimating the OLS model and reported in Model 1 of Table 
7.8 Overall, our sensitivity analysis suggests that our results are fairly robust to alternative CG/EM 
measures and estimation techniques, including any potential endogeneities. 
 
8. Summary and conclusion 
 
                                                 
7The choice of the alternative CG variables is based on the theoretical literature, empirical literature and the availability of data. 
Drawing from prior literature (e.g., Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 1999; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Petra, 2005; Bowen et al., 
2008; McCabe & Nowak, 2008; Tariq et al., 2014), the four new alternative CG variables include, board diversity on the basis of 
nationality, the number of non-executive directors on the board, capital expenditure and the number of board meetings. 
8Additionally and in an untabulated results, we conduct fixed-effect estimation in order to account for the potential 
existence of firm-level hetereogenities, such as company culture – with the central tenor of our findings 
remaining qualitatively or essentially the same, as reported previously.  
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Although a considerable number of studies have examined the effect of a number of corporate 
governance (CG) mechanisms on the extent of corporate earnings management (EM), their findings are 
largely mixed. Discernibly, existing studies have a number of limitations, including being informed 
mainly by the ubiquitous rational economics theory of agency, focusing primarily on developing countries 
and investigating mostly the effect of individual CG mechanisms on the extent of EM. By contrast, 
empirical evidence on why and how a firm’s CG might influence its level of EM is generally limited in 
developing countries, but particularly acute in the Middle East and North Africa region. Additionally, 
despite increasing evidence that the heavy reliance on the dominant rational agency theory is unable to 
provide a full explanation for magerial motivation to engage in EM and that there is a need to consider 
alternative theoretical perspectives, none of the existing studies have explicitly informed their analysis by 
drawing, for example, on the insights of behavioural theory of corporate boards and governance 
(Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011). Arguably, these developments 
limit current international understanding of how and why CG might constrain or facilitate corporate EM in 
different corporate contexts. Therefore, this paper has examined the effect of the quality of firm-level CG 
and Islamic governance (IG) committee on the extent of EM in Oman from 2001 to 2011. This coincides 
with a period in which the Omani authorities pursued CG reforms that were aimed at improving corporate 
performance and practices, including enhancing corporate disclosure and the quality of financial reports. 
Apart from articulating and applying behavioural theoretical perspective, which may be used by 
future studies in interpreting their results, our findings makes a number of new contributions to the 
extant CG literature. First, despite the theoretical expectation that the introduction of the 2002 Omani 
voluntary CG Code will facilite uniformity and convergence of CG practices, the findings from our 
extensive summary descriptive statistics suggest that CG standards in Omani listed corporations still differ 
widely over the eleven years investigated. Whereas the level of variability observed is comparable to those 
reported by prior studies, it seems to indicate that some degree of hetereogeneity exists when it comes to 
the importance that Omani listed corporations attach to CG practices. However, despite concerns that a 
voluntary CG Code may be ineffective in raising CG standards in Omani corporations given the context, 
our findings suggest that there has been gradual and observable improvement in CG standards over the 
eleven years investigated. Second, we find that, on average, better-governed corporations tend to engage 
significantly less in EM than their poorly-governed counterparts. This offers the first empirical evidence 
on the effect of the Omani CG reforms on the extent of EM among Omani listed firms, and seems to 
suggest that adopting a UK-style CG regime appears to be working to a certain degree in mitigating 
EM.  Third, we also find that corporations that have established IG committees engage significantly less 
in EM. In contrast, we do not find any evidence that board size, audit firm size, the presence of a CG 
committee, and board gender diversity have any significant relationship with the extent of corporate EM. 
Our results are fairly robust across a number of econometric models that sufficiently account for 
alternative CG and EM proxies, as well as potential endogeneity problems. Overall, our findings are 
generally consistent with the predictions of our behavioural theoretical framework.  
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Our results have a number of important implications for policy-makers and regulatory authorities. 
Evidence that CG standards in Omani listed corporations are generally improving imply that efforts by the 
various stakeholders of CG, such as the Omani Capital Market Authority and Muscat Securities Market 
have had a positive influence on CG practices. The relatively low and limited convergence in CG practices 
among Omani listed corporations, however, suggests that there is the need to further enhance compliance 
and enforcement. In this case, establishing a ‘compliance and enforcement’ unit that will continuously 
monitor corporate disclosures, including those relating to the various CG practices may be a step in the 
right direction. Finally and although our findings are fairly robust and important, its weaknesses need to be 
clearly articulated. Due to data limitations, we have focused mainly on how and why internal CG 
mechanisms may drive EM. Future research may improve their analsysis by examining how external CG 
structures, such as the media and the market for corporate and managerial control impact on EM. 
Similarly, due to data limitations, our analysis is limited to Omani listed firms. Thus, future studies may 
include non-listed firms, as well as firms from different countries to extend our evidence.  
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Appendix: Corpoarate governance (CG) practice disclosure index 
CG theme OCGI Item: Information on or reference to Range of 
scores 
Total score 
per theme 
(i) Board & 
directors 
1. Whether the board of directors’ number is between 5 and 12. 0-1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Whether the directors are clearly classified into executive, non-
executive and independent directors.  
0-1 
3. Whether the roles of chairperson and CEO are split. 0-1 
4. Whether the third of its board’s members is independent 
directors. 
0-1 
5. Whether the board is composed by a majority of non- executive 
directors.  
0-1 
6. Whether the directors’ membership number on other firms are 
specified and disclosed.  
0-1 
7. Whether directors’ membership number on other firms are less 
than 5. 
0-1 
8. Whether the board meets at least four times a year.  0-1 
9. Whether the board meetings’ dates are disclosed. 0-1 
10. Whether individual directors’ meetings record is disclosed. 0-1 
11. Whether individual directors’ meetings attendance record at the 
general assembly is disclosed.  
0-1 
12. Whether directors’ remuneration, interests and share options are 
disclosed. 
0-1 
13. Whether top five managers’ remuneration are disclosed. 0-1 
14. Whether individual directors’ service contracts, and notice period 
and severance fees are disclosed.  
0-1 
15. Whether the board approves interim and annual financial 
statements. 
0-1 
16. Whether a board’s report on the going concern status of firm is 
disclosed. 
0-1 
17. Whether the board has conducted a review on the effectiveness of 
firm’s internal control systems. 
0-1 
18. Whether there is a narrative on directors’ nomination procedures. 0-1 
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19. Whether a remuneration committee has been established. 0-1  
 
 
 
       39 
20. Whether remuneration’s committee jurisdictions and duties are 
disclosed. 
0-1 
21. Whether the remuneration committee’s members are disclosed.  0-1 
22. Whether the chairperson of remuneration committee is an 
independent. 
0-1 
23. Whether the majority of remuneration committee are 
independent. 
0-1 
24. Whether remuneration’s committee’s members’ remuneration is 
disclosed.  
0-1 
25. Whether remuneration’s committee members’ meetings 
attendance record is disclosed. 
0-1 
26. Whether a nomination committee has been established. 0-1 
27. Whether nomination’s committee jurisdictions and duties are 
disclosed. 
0-1 
28. Whether the nomination committee’s members are disclosed.   0-1 
29. Whether the chairperson of nomination committee is an 
independent. 
0-1 
30. Whether the majority of nomination committee’s members are 
independent.   
0-1 
31. Whether nomination’s committee members’ compensation is 
disclosed. 
0-1 
32. Whether nomination’s committee members’ meetings attendance 
record is disclosed. 
0-1 
33. Whether a risk committee has been established. 0-1 
34. Whether risk’s committee jurisdictions and duties are disclosed. 0-1 
35. Whether the risk committee’s members are disclosed 0-1 
36. Whether the chairperson of risk committee is an independent. 0-1 
37. Whether the majority of risk committee’s members are 
independent.  
0-1 
38. Whether risk’s committee members’ remuneration is disclosed. 0-1 
39. Whether risk’s committee members’ meetings attendance record 
is disclosed. 
0-1 
(ii) Accounting and 
auditing 
40. Whether an audit committee has been established. 0-1  
 
 
 
 
7 
41. Whether audit’s committee jurisdictions and duties are disclosed. 0-1 
42. Whether the audit committee’s members are disclosed.   0-1 
43. Whether the chairperson of audit committee is an independent. 0-1 
44. Whether the majority of audit committee’s members are 
independent.   
0-1 
45. Whether audit committee’s members’ compensation is disclosed.  0-1 
46. Whether audit’s committee members’ meetings attendance record 
is disclosed. 
0-1 
(iii) External 
auditors and 
internal control 
systems 
47. Whether an external auditor’s report on adequacy and efficacy of 
firm’s internal control systems is disclosed. 
0-1  
 
 
 
4 
48. Whether an external auditor report’s on firm’s compliance with 
its internal control system is disclosed. 
0-1 
49. Whether an external auditor report’s on firm’s ability to carry out 
its activities is disclosed. 
0-1 
50. Whether an external auditor’s report on frauds is disclosed.  0-1 
(iv) Disclosure and 
transparency  
51. Whether there is a narrative on the distribution of shareholding. 0-1  
52. Whether there is a narrative on how the firm is doing its activities 
in order to achieve its objectives. 
0-1  
53. Whether there is a narrative on investment opportunities. 0-1  
54. Whether there is a narrative on firm’s financial and operational 
performance. 
0-1  
55. Whether there is a narrative on risks and concerns and how are 
assessed and managed by the firm. 
0-1  
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56. Whether there is a narrative on firm’s performance in comparison 
to board based index of MSM.  
0-1  
57. Whether the firm has obtained a certificate from external auditor 
on its CG practices. 
0-1  
58. Whether the firm has provided a separate chapter in its annual 
report on CG 
0-1  
59. Whether the firm provides a statement on the compliance or non-
compliance with the 2002 code of CG.  
0-1  
60. Whether there is a narrative on penalties and strictures that might 
be imposed on firm by MSM, CMA or any statutory authority.  
0-1  
61. Whether there is a narrative on financial transactions that may 
have conflict of interests. 
0-1 22 
62. Whether there is a narrative on high and low market share prices 
during each month. 
0-1  
63. Whether there is a narrative on the professional profile of external 
auditor. 
0-1  
64. Whether there is a narrative on dividend policy. 0-1  
65. Whether there is a narrative on firm’s loans. 0-1  
66. Whether the firm posts its results online. 0-1  
67. Whether there is a narrative on firm’s convertible instrument. 0-1  
68. Whether firm sends its half-yearly results to each shareholders or 
not.  
0-1  
69. Whether there is a narrative on firm’s analysis of segment and 
product wise performance.  
0-1  
70. Whether there is a narrative on how firm sees and predicts its 
future. 
0-1  
71. Whether the firm includes management discussion and analysis 
chapter as part of its annual report.  
0-1  
72. Whether there is a narrative on directors’ biography, experience 
and responsibilities. 
0-1  
Total of 4 themes 72 OCGI Items  72 
 
 
Table 1 
Summary of the sample selection procedure 
Panel A: Industrial composition of firms listed on the MSM 
available to be sampled as at31/12/2011 
 No. of 
firms 
Percentage 
of firms 
 Basic materials    30    17.9 
 Consumer goods    25    14.9 
 Consumer services    24    14.3 
 Financial    53    31.5 
 Industrial    26    15.5 
 Utilities      5      2.9 
 Health care      2      1.2 
 Telecommunications      2      1.2 
 Oil & Gas      1      0.6 
Total firms   168  100.0 
   Less: Firms with no data available 48   
             Firms with missing data   4   
Total excluded firms    52   27.9 
Total  sampled firms with full data  116   69.0 
Panel B: Industrial composition of sampled  firms with full data    
 Basic materials    22   19.0 
 Consumer goods    21   18.1 
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Table 2 
Definition of dependent and independent variables 
Dependent variables 
  DA Discretionary accruals represent a firm-level EM practices as measured by modified 
Jones Model. 
Independent variables 
 Consumer services    21   18.1 
 Financial    29   25.0 
 Industrial    13   11.2 
 Utilities      5     4.3 
 Health care      2     1.7 
 Telecommunications      2     1.7 
 Oil & Gas      1     0.9 
Total  sampled firms with full data  116 100.0 
Source: Muscat Securities Market’s website    
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  OCGI Omani corporate governance index consisting of 72 governance provisions that take a 
value of 1 if a particular provision is disclosed, and 0 otherwise; scaled to a value 
between 0% and 100%. 
  IGC 1 if a firm has set up a Islamic governance committee, 0 otherwise. 
  BSIZE The total number of directors on the board of a firm. 
  BIG4 1 if a firm is audited by one of the biggest four audit firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
  CGCOM 
  GNDR 
1 if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. 
1 if a firm has at least one woman on its board, 0 otherwise 
Control variables 
  BLKOWN Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total firm shareholdings. 
  GOVOWN 1 if a firm has government ownership, 0 otherwise. 
  INSOWN Percentage of institutional ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings. 
  FOROWN Percentage of foreign ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings.  
  LNTA Natural log of total assets. 
  ROA (%) Operating profit to total assets. 
  GROWTH (%) Current year’s sales minus last year’s sales to last year’s sales. 
  LVRG (%) Book total debt scaled by total assets of a firm.  
  INDUSTRY Dummies for each of the eight industries. 
  YEAR Dummies for each of the ten years. 
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Table 3 
Summary descriptive statistics of levels of compliance with corporate governance disclosure index (OCGI) and sub-indices (%) 
        All             2001           2002           2003        2004      2005       2006        2007         2008         2009         2010         2011 
Panel A: All provisions contained in the Oaudi corporate governance index (OCGI) 
Mean 47.8974 6.7819 17.4190 33.6627 47.2222 54.0351 55.3686 58.6336 59.6248 60.9284 61.0749 60.1768 
Median 54.1667 5.5556 8.3333 41.6667 50.0000 54.1667 55.5556 58.3333 59.0278 59.7222 59.7222 59.7222 
STD 21.7747 2.3565 16.7201 21.7550 17.4887 11.5620 10.9602 10.7947 9.9774 9.9513 9.9535 9.2303 
Min 1.3889 1.3889 2.7778 1.3889 1.3889 4.1667 6.9444 34.7222 34.7222 34.7222 30.5556 33.3333 
Max 88.8889 12.5000 62.5000 73.6111 75.0000 77.7778 77.7778 88.8889 87.5000 88.8889 87.5000 84.7222 
Panel B: Board & Directors 
Mean 38.5884 1.5276 11.0577 25.0330 37.0538 43.0499 43.8856 48.0480 49.4602 50.9447 51.2821 51.9114 
Median 41.0256 1.2821 2.5641 28.2051 35.8974 38.4615 41.0256 46.1538 48.7179 51.2821 53.8462 53.8462 
STD 21.8379 1.7362 16.1583 20.4284 17.4004 13.9938 13.3751 14.8256 13.8301 14.2274 14.4050 13.6839 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 20.5128 25.6410 25.6410 17.9487 20.5128 
Max 97.4359 7.6923 58.9744 71.7949 74.3590 79.4872 76.9231 97.4359 97.4359 97.4359 97.4359 97.4359 
Panel C: Accounting & Auditing 
Mean 75.3720 0.0000 20.6845 54.6392 79.8319 92.1805 92.9945 92.6641 92.9825 94.8622 95.0311 94.0260 
Median 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 71.4286 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 
STD 38.9407 0.0000 34.8000 44.4166 35.9808 17.4053 17.0077 18.1587 16.3762 14.6141 14.2912 13.3202 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 28.5714 
Max 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 
Panel D: External Auditors & Internal Control Systems 
Mean 2.4300 2.3900 2.3400 3.3500 1.9600 1.3200 2.8800 2.4800 2.4100 2.1900 2.3900 2.9500 
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
STD 7.7670 7.3950 7.3250 8.5610 6.7540 5.6120 8.7490 8.2260 8.1260 7.8430 8.0930 8.1080 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Max 50.0000 25.0000 25.0000 25.0000 25.0000 25.0000 50.0000 50.0000 50.0000 50.0000 50.0000 25.0000 
Panel E: Disclosure & Transparency  
Mean 64.0349 19.0522 30.3977 47.7976 63.1462 71.0048 73.3392 76.9451 77.5917 78.7081 78.4980 74.7521 
Median 72.7273 18.1818 22.7273 54.5455 68.1818 72.7273 77.2727 77.2727 77.2727 77.2727 77.2727 77.2727 
STD 24.3873 6.6750 18.4114 24.4262 20.7058 13.5908 12.8886 11.3299 11.6433 11.6212 11.8488 11.1949 
Min 4.5455 4.5455 9.0909 4.5455 4.5455 13.6364 18.1818 40.9091 36.3636 36.3636 36.3636 40.9091 
Max 100.0000 40.9091 81.8182 86.3636 100.0000 95.4545 95.4545 95.4545 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 95.4545 
Notes: This Table reports descriptive statistics of the aggregate levels of compliance with the Omani corporate governance index (OCGI) from 2001 to 2011.  
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Table 4 
Summary descriptive statistics of the other variables for all (1,152) firm years 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variables 
   DA   0.0304   0.0308   0.1017 -0.1946   0.3301 
Independent variables 
  OCGI  47.8974 54.1667 21.7747   1.3889 88.8889 
  IGC   0.0122   0.0000   0.1096   0.0000   1.0000 
  BSIZE   7.3437   7.0000   1.7885   4.0000 13.0000 
  BIG4   0.7100   1.0000   0.4539   0.0000   1.0000 
  CGCOM   0.1588   0.0000   0.3656   0.0000   1.0000 
  GNDR   0.1770   0.0000   0.3819   0.0000   1.0000 
Control variables 
  BLKOWN 54.8402 56.5927 24.3699   0.0000 99.4700 
  GOVOWN   0.2578    0.0000   0.4376   0.0000    1.0000 
  INSOWN 20.3921  12.4205 22.6782   0.0000 90.8500 
  FOROWN 10.4591    0.0000 20.0972   0.0000 90.1300 
  LNTA 16.6222 16.4241   1.4732 14.4500 19.9400 
  ROA   0.0573   0.0504   0.0980  -0.1368   0.2500 
  GROWTH   0.7858   0.6735   0.4408   0.1990   1.8570 
  LVRG   0.3300   0.2678   0.2937   0.0001   0.9530 
Notes: DA denotes the firm-level EM practices, OCGI denotes the Omani corporate governance index, IGC denotes Islamic 
governance committee,  BSIZE denotes the size of board, BIG4 denotes the audit firm size, CGCOM denotes the presence of a 
corporate governance committee, GNDR denotes board diversity on the basis of gender, BLKOWN denotes block ownership, 
GOVOWN represents government ownership, INSOWN denotes institutional ownership, FOROWN represents foreign ownership, 
LNTA denotes firm size, ROA denotes firm profitability, GROWTH denotes firm growth and LVRG denotes leverage. 
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Table 5 
Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation matrices of the dependent, independent, and control variables 
  DA OCGI IGC BSIZE BIG4 CGCOM GNDR BLKOWN GOVOWN INSOWN FOROWN LNTA ROA GROWTH LVRG 
DA  0.007 -0.061** -0.016 -0.018 0.015 -0.001 0.004 -0.011 -0.010 -0.003 0.014 0.278*** 0.032 0.060** 
OCGI 0.039  0.073** 0.088*** 0.100*** 0.299*** 0.086*** -0.007 0.155*** 0.015 0.076*** 0.347*** 0.173*** 0.006 -0.077*** 
IGC -0.047 0.038  0.156*** 0.071** -0.048 0.094*** -0.039 0.007 -0.028 0.069** 0.181*** -0.067** -0.046 0.162*** 
BSIZE -0.023 0.046 0.175***  0.252*** -0.055* 0.013 -0.266*** 0.085*** -0.001 0.008 0.391*** 0.054* -0.111*** -0.032 
BIG4 -0.018 0.030 0.071** 0.255***  0.110*** 0.056* -0.161*** 0.062** 0.001 0.020 0.377*** 0.098*** -0.072** -0.039 
CGCOM -0.003 0.279*** -0.048 -0.052* 0.110***  0.022 -0.013 0.048 0.010 0.001 0.092*** 0.069** 0.012 -0.177*** 
GNDR -0.007 0.079*** 0.094*** 0.006 0.056* 0.022  0.054* 0.059** -0.050* 0.067** 0.110*** 0.045 0.017 0.057* 
BLKOWN 0.002 0.068** -0.038 -0.272*** -0.160*** -0.009 0.051  0.109*** 0.226*** 0.339*** -0.223*** -0.128*** 0.053* 0.094*** 
GOVOWN -0.027 0.154*** 0.007 0.101*** 0.062** 0.048 0.059** 0.118***  -0.031 0.047 0.154*** 0.206*** -0.114*** -0.118*** 
INSOWN 0.006 0.029 -0.043 -0.045 -0.011 0.016 -0.019 0.314*** -0.062**  -0.029 -0.163*** 0.035 -0.036 0.044 
FOROWN 0.005 0.072** 0.053* -0.044 -0.007 0.019 0.057** 0.355*** 0.038 -0.150***  0.140*** 0.005 -0.128*** 0.021 
LNTA -0.009 0.275*** 0.244*** 0.441*** 0.369*** 0.069** 0.113*** -0.206*** 0.169*** -0.187*** 0.087***  0.179*** -0.149*** 0.044 
ROA 0.285*** 0.180*** -0.045 0.080*** 0.101*** 0.064** 0.057* -0.114*** 0.207*** 0.024 -0.041 0.170***  -0.197*** -0.346*** 
GROWTH 0.016 -0.006 -0.054* -0.096*** -0.073** -0.004 0.014 0.044 -0.088*** -0.043 -0.096*** -0.176*** -0.193***  -0.043 
LVRG 0.090*** -0.092*** 0.194*** -0.009 0.034 -0.193*** 0.046 0.084*** -0.081*** 0.059** 0.046 0.086*** -0.355*** -0.055*  
Notes: the bottom left half of the table presents Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whilst the upper right half of the table presents Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. DA denotes the firm-level 
EM practices, OCGI denotes the Omani corporate governance index, IGC  denotes  Islamic governance committee, BSIZE denotes the size of board, BIG4 denotes the audit firm size, CGCOM denotes the presence of a 
corporate governance committee, GNDR denotes board diversity on the basis of gender, BLKOWN denotes block ownership, GOVOWN represents government ownership, INSOWN denotes institutional ownership, 
FOROWN represents foreign ownership, LNTA denotes firm size, ROA denotes firm profitability, GROWTH denotes firm growth and LVRG denotes leverage . The correlation matrix depicts the strength and sign of the 
relationship amongst the variables. ***, ** and * denote correlation is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 6 
The effects of corporate and Islamic governance mechanisms on corporate earnings managements 
 Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Independent Variable Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values 
  OCGI -0.0005 0.0749* -0.0004 0.0800* -       - -      - -0.0004 0.0919* -0.0003 0.0237** -0.0002 0.6570 -0.0003 0.1603 
  IGC -0.0601 0.0012*** -     - -0.0613 0.0011*** -      - -0.0603 0.0313** -0.0627 0.0250** -0.0622 0.0272** -0.0601 0.0323** 
  BSIZE 0.0175 0.2158 -     -       -       - 0.0130 0.3522 0.0175 0.2343 0.0167 0.2530 0.0167 0.2605 0.0165 0.2623 
  BIG4 -0.0040 0.5758 -     -       -       - -0.0036 0.6146 -0.0039 0.5830 -0.0040 0.5778 -0.0042 0.5604 -0.0042 0.5591 
  CGCOM 0.0118 0.1695 -     -       -       - 0.0093 0.2759 0.0120 0.1702 0.0115 0.1794 0.0087 0.3096 0.0093 0.2745 
  GNDR -0.0098 0.2061 -     -       -       - -0.0106 0.1799 -0.0094 0.2328 -0.0100 0.2068 -0.0095 0.2330 -0.0101 0.2048 
Control Variables:         
   BLKOWN 0.0003 0.0508* 0.0002 0.1278 0.0003 0.0625* 0.0003 0.0358** 0.0003 0.0605* 0.0003 0.0806* 0.0003 0.0437** 0.0003 0.0700* 
   GOVOWN -0.0186 0.0142** -0.0178 0.0171** -0.0188 0.0133** -0.0195 0.0111** -0.0186 0.0133** -0.0190 0.0111** -0.0195 0.0097*** -0.0193 0.0099*** 
   INSOWN -0.0003 0.0263** -0.0003 0.0403** -0.0004 0.0213** -0.0004 0.0165** -0.0004 0.0192** -0.0003 0.0233** -0.0004 0.0119** -0.0003 0.0267** 
   FOROWN -0.0001 0.7016 -0.0001 0.6451 -0.0001 0.6937 -0.0001 0.6535 -0.0001 0.6599 -0.0001 0.6971 -0.0001 0.6452 -0.0001 0.7076 
   LNTA -0.0042 0.1384 -0.0046 0.0828* -0.0047 0.0687* -0.0060 0.0317** -0.0044 0.1384 -0.0047 0.1096 -0.0054 0.0671* -0.0045 0.1238 
   ROA 0.4867 0.0000*** 0.4806 0.0000*** 0.4813 0.0000*** 0.4879 0.0000*** 0.4856 0.0000*** 0.4882 0.0000*** 0.4848 0.0000*** 0.4891 0.0000*** 
   GROWTH 0.0195 0.0046*** 0.0190 0.0057*** 0.0188 0.0066*** 0.0194 0.0052*** 0.0194 0.0047*** 0.0193 0.0049*** 0.0193 0.0053*** 0.0194 0.0049*** 
   LVRG 0.0971 0.0000*** 0.0887 0.0000*** 0.0944 0.0000*** 0.0944 0.0000*** 0.0974 0.0000*** 0.0966 0.0000*** 0.0994 0.0000*** 0.0976 0.0000*** 
   Industry dummies  Included  Included  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
  Year dummies 
 Included  Included  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.0618 0.2223 0.0988 0.0579* 0.0812 0.0946* 0.0772 0.1250 0.0536 0.3253 0.0733 0.1799 0.0626 0.2557 0.0671 0.2200 
Durbin-Watson Stat. 2.0147 2.0153 2.0162 2.0172 2.0150 2.0151 2.0166 2.0155 
F- value     8.9868***  10.2196***  10.2998***     9.2323***     8.9489***     9.0367***     8.8487***     8.9164*** 
Adjusted R2 0.1865 0.1833 0.1846 0.1816 0.1857 0.1874 0.1838 0.1851 
No. of observations 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 
Notes: OCGI denotes the Omani corporate governance index. IGC  denotes  Islamic governance committee, BSIZ denotes board size. BIG4 denotes audit firm size. BLKOWN, GOVOWN, INSOWN and FOROWN represent block ownership, 
government ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership structures, respectively. LNTA denotes firm size. ROA denotes firm profitability. GROWTH denotes firm growth. LVRG denotes firm leverage. Industry dummies represent dummy 
variables that are used to capture the basic materials sector, consumer goods sector, consumer service sector, financial sector, health care sector, industrial sector, utility sector and telecommunications sector. Year dummies represent dummy 
variables that are used to capture year effects (2001-2011). The asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Adj. R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
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Table 7 
 Robustness tests of the effects of corporate and Islamic governance mechanisms on earnings managements  
                                      Dependent variable 
 Model Main Model 
(1) 
Weighted-OCGI 
(2) 
Kothari Model  
(3) 
Non-financial 
(4) 
Pre 2003 
(5) 
Post 2003 
 (6) 
2SLS 
(7) 
Independent 
Variable Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values 
   OCGI -0.0005 0.0749* -0.0006 0.0442** -0.0005 0.0844* -0.0009 0.0014*** -0.0008 0.1161 -0.0004 0.0950* -      - 
   P_OCGI - -  -    -   -     - -      - - - -      - -0.0302 0.0843* 
   IGC -0.0601 0.0012*** -0.0610 0.0009*** -0.0625 0.0007*** -      - -0.0548 0.0425** -0.0622 0.0417** -0.0549 0.0530* 
   BSIZE 0.0175 0.2158 0.0177 0.2100 0.0155 0.2710 0.0323 0.0393** 0.0526 0.0800* 0.0116 0.4607 0.0162 0.2715 
   BIG4 -0.0040 0.5758 -0.0040 0.5719 -0.0046 0.5182 -0.0093 0.1966 0.0035 0.8607 -0.0057 0.4434 -0.0046 0.5167 
   CGCOM 0.0118 0.1695 0.0118 0.1641 0.0136 0.1120 0.0152 0.1119 0.0074 0.7478 0.0097 0.2518 0.0088 0.3012 
   GNDR -0.0098 0.2061 -0.0100 0.1978 -0.0090 0.2445 -0.0141 0.1119 -0.0197 0.1977 -0.0071 0.3833 -0.0104 0.1899 
Control Variables:     
   BLKOWN 0.0003 0.0508* 0.0003 0.0529* 0.0003 0.0694* 0.0003 0.0874* 0.0001 0.7572 0.0003 0.0497** 0.0003 0.0562* 
   GOVOWN -0.0186 0.0142** -0.0186 0.0142** -0.0184 0.0155 -0.0004 0.0782* -0.0061 0.7599 -0.0223 0.0042*** -0.0189 0.0118** 
   INSOWN -0.0003 0.0263** -0.0003 0.0251** -0.0003 0.0316** -0.0003 0.1249 0.0001 0.7476 -0.0004 0.0090*** -0.0004 0.0102*** 
   FOROWN -0.0001 0.7016 -0.0001 0.6951 -0.0001 0.7089 -0.0003 0.1452 -0.0004 0.4129 -0.0001 0.5862 -0.0001 0.6541 
   LNTA -0.0042 0.1384 -0.0044 0.1156 -0.0012 0.6780 0.0003 0.9239 -0.0076 0.2171 -0.0035 0.2618 -0.0050 0.0854* 
   ROA 0.4867 0.0000*** 0.4858 0.0000*** 0.1836 0.0000*** 0.4314 0.0000*** 0.3343 0.0014*** 0.5007 0.0000*** 0.4880 0.0000*** 
   GROWTH 0.0195 0.0046*** 0.0194 0.0047*** 0.0207 0.0026*** 0.0173 0.0162** 0.0204 0.2675 0.0152 0.0389** 0.0213 0.0023*** 
   LVRG 0.0971 0.0000*** 0.0975 0.0000*** 0.0940 0.0000*** 0.0846 0.0000*** 0.1053 0.0008*** 0.0873 0.0000** 0.0999 0.0000*** 
   Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included Included Included Included 
  Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.0618 0.2223 0.0705 0.1629 0.0022 0.9653 -0.0197 0.7560 -0.1725 0.0278** 0.0813 0.1517 0.1739 0.0428** 
Durbin-Watson  Sta. 2.0147 2.0147 2.0154 2.0085 1.9998 2.0047 2.0166 
F- value     8.9868***     9.0380***     5.3106***    6.0874***     1.7459**    8.3125***     8.9552*** 
Adjusted R2 0.1865 0.1874 0.1101 0.1556 0.0869 0.1910 0.1859 
No. of observations 1152 1152 1152 859 190 962 1152 
Notes: OCGI denotes the Omani corporate governance index. IGC  denotes  Islamic governance committee, BSIZ denotes board size. BIG4 denotes audit firm size. BLKOWN, GOVOWN, INSOWN and 
FOROWN represent block ownership, government ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership structures, respectively. LNTA denotes firm size. ROA denotes firm profitability. GROWTH denotes 
firm growth. LVRG denotes firm leverage. Industry dummies represent dummy variables that are used to capture the basic materials sector, consumer goods sector, consumer service sector, financial sector, 
health care sector, industrial sector, utility sector and telecommunications sector. Year dummies represent dummy variables that are used to capture year effects (2001-2011). The asterisks ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Adj. R2 denotes adjusted R square. F-Stat denotes the F-statistics. 
 
